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#pragmatism

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Were you interested in this work on Normative Philosophy and Qualitative Methods but couldnt make it to Durham? Already doing this kind of project elsewhere? Sign up for our research network at groups.google.com/g/qualitativ... Please share widely! #philosophy #qualitative #politics #pragmatism

RE: https://bsky.app/profile/did:plc:osrdwh6lyrz7muynzkqkzp4f/post/3ll5d7j4mrk2h

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A quotation from Teddy Roosevelt

   All men in whose character there is not an element of hardened baseness must admit the need in our public life of those qualities which we somewhat vaguely group together when we speak of “reform,” and all men of sound mind must also admit the need of efficiency.
   There are, of course, men of such low moral type, or of such ingrained cynicism, that they do not believe in the possibility of making anything better, or do not care to see things better. There are also men who are slightly disordered mentally, or who are cursed with a moral twist which makes them champion reforms less from a desire to do good to others than as a kind of tribute to their own righteousness, for the sake of emphasizing their own superiority. From neither of these classes can we get any real help in the unending struggle for righteousness.
   There remains the great body of the people, including the entire body of those through whom the salvation of the people must ultimately be worked out. All these men combine or seek to combine in varying degrees the quality of striving after the ideal, that is, the quality which makes men reformers, and the quality of so striving through practical methods — the quality which makes men efficient. Both qualities are absolutely essential. The absence of either makes the presence of the other worthless or worse.

Theodore Roosevelt (1858-1919) American politician, statesman, conservationist, writer, US President (1901-1909)
Essay (1900-06), “Latitude and Longitude Among Reformers,” The Century Magazine, Vol. 60, No. 2

Sourcing, notes: wist.info/roosevelt-theodore/1…

Excellent Sunday afternoon read from Professor @drmichaellevin for Noema Magazine that takes a look at the metaphors we use to distinguish between organic and non-organic beings and challenges some of the assumptions around what we consider to be machines and/or living things.

Very much in the style of Donna Haraway, he advocates at once for #pragmatism, for empirically testing the methods we use for interrogating systems that imbricate the organic and the machine and to keep an open mind when categorising which is which.

For fans of Douglas Hofstadter, #cybernetics, #systems and #ConsequentialCategories.

noemamag.com/living-things-are

NOEMALiving Things Are Not Machines (Also, They Totally Are) | NOEMAOur formal models of life, computers and materials fail to tell the entire story of their capabilities and limitations.

Signs Of Signs • 4

Re: Michael HarrisLanguage About Language

But then inevitably I find myself wondering whether a proof assistant, or even a formal system, can make the distinction between “technical” and “fundamental” questions.  There seems to be no logical distinction.  The formalist answer might involve algorithmic complexity, but I don’t think that sheds any useful light on the question.  The materialist answer (often? usually?) amounts to just‑so stories involving Darwin, and lions on the savannah, and maybe an elephant, or at least a mammoth.  I don’t find these very satisfying either and would prefer to find something in between, and I would feel vindicated if it could be proved (in I don’t know what formal system) that the capacity to make such a distinction entails appreciation of music.

Peirce proposed a distinction between corollarial and theorematic reasoning in mathematics which strikes me as similar to the distinction Michael Harris seeks between technical and fundamental questions.

I can’t say I have a lot of insight into how the distinction might be drawn but I recall a number of traditions pointing to the etymology of theorem as having to do with the observation of objects and practices whose depth of detail always escapes full accounting by any number of partial views.

On the subject of music, all I have is the following incidental —

🙞 Riffs and Rotes

Perhaps it takes a number theorist to appreciate it …

Resources

cc: Academia.edu • BlueSky • Laws of FormMathstodonResearch Gate
cc: Conceptual GraphsCyberneticsStructural ModelingSystems Science

Mathematics without Apologies, by Michael Harris · About the authorMichael Harris is professor of mathematics at the Université Paris-Diderot and Columbia University.  He is the author or coauthor of more than seventy mathematical books and articles, and has recei…

Signs Of Signs • 3

Re: Michael HarrisLanguage About Language

And if we don’t [keep our stories straight], who puts us away?

One’s answer, or at least one’s initial response to that question will turn on how one feels about formal realities.  As I understand it, reality is that which persists in thumping us on the head until we get what it’s trying to tell us.  Are there formal realities, forms which drive us in that way?

Discussions like those tend to begin by supposing we can form a distinction between external and internal.  That is a formal hypothesis, not yet born out as a formal reality.  Are there formal realities which drive us to recognize them, to pick them out of a crowd of formal possibilities?

Resources

cc: Academia.edu • BlueSky • Laws of FormMathstodonResearch Gate
cc: Conceptual GraphsCyberneticsStructural ModelingSystems Science

Mathematics without Apologies, by Michael HarrisMathematics without Apologies, by Michael HarrisAn unapologetic guided tour of the mathematical life

Signs Of Signs • 2

Re: Michael HarrisLanguage About Language

I compared mathematics to a “consensual hallucination”, like virtual reality, and I continue to believe that the aim is to get (consensually) to the point where that hallucination is a second nature.

I think that’s called coherentism, normally contrasted with or complementary to objectivism.  It’s the philosophy of a gang of co‑conspirators who think, “We’ll get off scot‑free so long as we all keep our stories straight.”

Resources

cc: Academia.edu • BlueSky • Laws of FormMathstodonResearch Gate
cc: Conceptual GraphsCyberneticsStructural ModelingSystems Science

Mathematics without Apologies, by Michael HarrisMathematics without Apologies, by Michael HarrisAn unapologetic guided tour of the mathematical life

Signs Of Signs • 1

Re: Michael HarrisLanguage About Language

There is a language and a corresponding literature treating logic and mathematics as related species of communication and information gathering, namely, the pragmatic‑semiotic tradition transmitted through the lifelong efforts of C.S. Peirce.  It is by no means a dead language but it continues to fly beneath the radar of many trackers in logic and math today.  Nevertheless, the resource remains for those who wish to look into it.

Resources

cc: Academia.edu • BlueSky • Laws of FormMathstodonResearch Gate
cc: Conceptual GraphsCyberneticsStructural ModelingSystems Science

Mathematics without Apologies, by Michael HarrisMathematics without Apologies, by Michael HarrisAn unapologetic guided tour of the mathematical life
Continued thread

Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 10.2
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/02
bsky.app/profile/inquiryintoin

In logical terms, the analogy of experience proceeds by inducing a Rule about the validity of a current knowledge base and then by deducing a Fact, the applicability of that knowledge base to a current experience.

Step 1 is Inductive, abstracting a Rule from a Case and a Fact.

• Case : E_past ⇒ E_poss, Chosen events fairly sample Collective events.
• Fact : E_past ⇒ K_pres, Chosen events support the Knowledge regime.
────────────────────────────────────────────────
• Rule : E_poss ⇒ K_pres, Collective events support the Knowledge regime.

Step 2 is Deductive, admitting a Case to a Rule and arriving at a Fact.

• Case : E_pres ⇒ E_poss, Current events fairly sample Collective events.
• Rule : E_poss ⇒ K_pres, Collective events support the Knowledge regime.
────────────────────────────────────────────────
• Fact : E_pres ⇒ K_pres, Current events support the Knowledge regime.

References —

Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), 40–52.
pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/i
academia.edu/57812482/Interpre

Dewey, J. (1910), How We Think, D.C. Heath, Boston, MA. Reprinted (1991), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY.
gutenberg.org/files/37423/3742

Resources —

Survey of Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/02

Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01



Analogy of Experience
Inquiry Into Inquiry · Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 10
More from Inquiry Into Inquiry

Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 10.1
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/02
bsky.app/profile/inquiryintoin

Transfer —

Returning to the scene of Dewey's “Sign of Rain” example, let's continue examining how the transfer of knowledge through the analogy of experience works in that case.

By way of a recap, we began by considering a fragment K_pres of the reasoner's knowledge base which is logically equivalent to a conjunction of two rules.

• K_pres ⇔ (B ⇒ A) ∧ (B ⇒ D).

K_pres may be thought of as a piece of knowledge or item of information allowing for the possibility of certain conditions, expressed in the form of a logical constraint on the present universe of discourse.

Next we found it convenient to express all logical statements in terms of their models, that is, in terms of the primitive circumstances or elements of experience over which they hold true.

• Let E_past be the chosen set of experiences, or the circumstances in mind under “past experience”.

• Let E_poss be the collective set of experiences, or the prospective total of possible circumstances.

• Let E_pres be the current experience, or the circumstances immediately present to the reasoner.

If we think of the knowledge base K_pres as referring to the “regime of experience” over which it is valid, then the sets of models involved in the analogy may be ordered according to the relationships of set inclusion or logical implication existing among them.

Figure 4 shows the subsumption relations involved in the analogy of experience.

Figure 4. Analogy of Experience
inquiryintoinquiry.files.wordp



Continued thread

Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 9.2
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/01

Transfer —

In logical terms, the analogy of experience proceeds by inducing a Rule about the validity of a current knowledge base and then by deducing a Fact, the applicability of that knowledge base to a current experience.

Step 1 is Inductive, abstracting a Rule from a Case and a Fact.

• Case : E_past ⇒ E_poss, Chosen events fairly sample Collective events.
• Fact : E_past ⇒ K_pres, Chosen events support the Knowledge regime.
────────────────────────────────────────────────
• Rule : E_poss ⇒ K_pres, Collective events support the Knowledge regime.

Step 2 is Deductive, admitting a Case to a Rule and arriving at a Fact.

• Case : E_pres ⇒ E_poss, Current events fairly sample Collective events.
• Rule : E_poss ⇒ K_pres, Collective events support the Knowledge regime.
────────────────────────────────────────────────
• Fact : E_pres ⇒ K_pres, Current events support the Knowledge regime.

References —

Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), 40–52.
pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/i
academia.edu/57812482/Interpre

Dewey, J. (1910), How We Think, D.C. Heath, Boston, MA. Reprinted (1991), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY.
gutenberg.org/files/37423/3742

Resources —

Survey of Abduction, Deduction, Induction, Analogy, Inquiry
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/02

Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01



Inquiry Into Inquiry · Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 9
More from Inquiry Into Inquiry

Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 9.1
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/01

Transfer —

Let's examine how the transfer of knowledge through the analogy of experience works in the case of Dewey's “Sign of Rain” example.

For concreteness, consider a fragment K_pres of the reasoner's knowledge base which is logically equivalent to a conjunction of two rules.

• K_pres ⇔ (B ⇒ A) ∧ (B ⇒ D).

K_pres may be thought of as a piece of knowledge or item of information allowing for the possibility of certain conditions, expressed in the form of a logical constraint on the present universe of discourse.

It is convenient to have the option of expressing all logical statements in terms of their models, that is, in terms of the primitive circumstances or elements of experience over which they hold true.

• Let E_past be the chosen set of experiences, or the circumstances in mind under “past experience”.

• Let E_poss be the collective set of experiences, or the prospective total of possible circumstances.

• Let E_pres be the current experience, or the circumstances immediately present to the reasoner.

If we think of the knowledge base K_pres as referring to the “regime of experience” over which it is valid, then the sets of models involved in the analogy may be ordered according to the relationships of set inclusion or logical implication existing among them.



Inquiry Into Inquiry · Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 9
More from Inquiry Into Inquiry

Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 8
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/01

Transfer —

What exactly gives the acquisition of a knowledge base its distinctively inductive character? It is evidently the “analogy of experience” involved in applying what we've learned in the past to what confronts us in the present.

Whenever we find ourselves approaching a problem with the thought, “If past experience is any guide …” we can be sure the analogy of experience has come into play. We are seeking to find analogies between past experience as a totality and present experience as a point of application.

From a statistical point of view what we mean is this — “If past experience is a fair sample of possible experience then knowledge gained from past experience may usefully apply to present experience”. It is that mechanism which allows a knowledge base to be carried across gulfs of experience which remain indifferent to the effective contents of its rules.

Next we'll examine how the transfer of knowledge through the analogy of experience works out in the case of Dewey's “Sign of Rain” example.

References —

Awbrey, J.L., and Awbrey, S.M. (1995), “Interpretation as Action : The Risk of Inquiry”, Inquiry : Critical Thinking Across the Disciplines 15(1), 40–52.
pdcnet.org/inquiryct/content/i
academia.edu/57812482/Interpre

Dewey, J. (1910), How We Think, D.C. Heath, Boston, MA. Reprinted (1991), Prometheus Books, Buffalo, NY.
gutenberg.org/files/37423/3742



Inquiry Into Inquiry · Interpreter and Interpretant • Selection 8
More from Inquiry Into Inquiry

Zeroth Law Of Semiotics
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2015/07

Meaning is a privilege not a right.
Not all pictures depict.
Not all signs denote.

Meaning is a privilege not a right.
Not all pictures depict.
Not all signs denote.

Never confuse a property of a sign,
just for instance, existence,
with a sign of a property,
for instance, existence.

Taking a property of a sign
for a sign of a property
is the zeroth sign of
nominal thinking
and the first
mistake.

Also Sprach 0*
9 October 2002

Inquiry Into Inquiry · Zeroth Law Of Semiotics
More from Inquiry Into Inquiry