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Higher Order Sign Relations • Discussion 1
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/03

Re: FB | Charles S. Peirce Society • John Corcoran
facebook.com/groups/peircesoci

Questions about the proper treatment of use and mention from the standpoint of Peirce’s theory of signs came up recently in discussions on Facebook. In pragmatic semiotics the trade‑off between “signs-of-objects” and “signs-as-objects” opens up the wider space of Higher Order Sign Relations. In previous work on Inquiry Driven Systems I introduced the subject in the following way.

When interpreters reflect on their use of signs they require an appropriate technical language in which to pursue their reflections. They need signs referring to sign relations, signs referring to elements and components of sign relations, and signs referring to properties and classes of sign relations. The orders of signs developing as reflection evolves can be organized under the heading of “higher order signs” and the reflective sign relations involving them can be referred to as “higher order sign relations”.

References —

John Corcoran
johncorcoran.academia.edu/

Schemata : The Concept of Schema in the History of Logic
academia.edu/12691868/SCHEMATA

Use And Mention, Use Without Mention, Mention Without Use
academia.edu/s/ea64a3484e/sche

Resources —

Higher Order Sign Relations
oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_S

Survey of Inquiry Driven Systems
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/02

Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01




Inquiry Into Inquiry · Higher Order Sign Relations • Discussion 1
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Higher Order Sign Relations • Discussion 1

Re: FB | Charles S. Peirce SocietyJohn Corcoran

Questions about the proper treatment of use and mention from the standpoint of Peirce’s theory of signs came up recently in discussions on Facebook.  In pragmatic semiotics the trade‑off between “signs-of-objects” and “signs-as-objects” opens up the wider space of higher order sign relations.  In previous work on Inquiry Driven Systems I introduced the subject in the following way.

When interpreters reflect on their use of signs they require an appropriate technical language in which to pursue their reflections.  They need signs referring to sign relations, signs referring to elements and components of sign relations, and signs referring to properties and classes of sign relations.  The orders of signs developing as reflection evolves can be organized under the heading of “higher order signs” and the reflective sign relations involving them can be referred to as “higher order sign relations”.

References

Resources

cc: Academia.edu • BlueSky • Laws of FormMathstodonResearch Gate
cc: Conceptual GraphsCyberneticsStructural ModelingSystems Science

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Higher Order Sign Relations • 1
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/03

Higher Order Sign Relations • Introduction —

When interpreters reflect on their use of signs they require an appropriate technical language in which to pursue their reflections. They need signs referring to sign relations, signs referring to elements and components of sign relations, and signs referring to properties and classes of sign relations. The orders of signs developing as reflection evolves can be organized under the heading of “higher order signs” and the reflective sign relations involving them can be referred to as “higher order sign relations”.

Some years ago I was formatting my old dissertation proposal on Inquiry Driven Systems for the web when the subject of “signs about signs” arose on the Peirce List. It called to mind the part of my document on Higher Order Sign Relations, on which basis Reflective Interpretive Frameworks are constructed, and the introduction to which begins as above.

Resources —

Inquiry Driven Systems
oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_S

Reflective Interpretive Frameworks
oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_S

Higher Order Sign Relations
oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_S

Survey of Inquiry Driven Systems
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/02

Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01



Inquiry Into Inquiry · Higher Order Sign Relations • 1
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Higher Order Sign Relations • 1

Higher Order Sign Relations • Introduction

When interpreters reflect on their use of signs they require an appropriate technical language in which to pursue their reflections.  They need signs referring to sign relations, signs referring to elements and components of sign relations, and signs referring to properties and classes of sign relations.  The orders of signs developing as reflection evolves can be organized under the heading of “higher order signs” and the reflective sign relations involving them can be referred to as “higher order sign relations”.

Some years ago I was formatting my old dissertation proposal on Inquiry Driven Systems for the web when the subject of “signs about signs” arose on the Peirce List.  It called to mind the part of my document on Higher Order Sign Relations, on which basis Reflective Interpretive Frameworks are constructed, and the introduction to which begins as above.

Resources

cc: Academia.edu • BlueSky • Laws of FormMathstodonResearch Gate
cc: Conceptual GraphsCyberneticsStructural ModelingSystems Science

oeis.orgInquiry Driven Systems • Overview - OeisWiki
Continued thread

Signs Of Signs • 4
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/03

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language
mathematicswithoutapologies.wo

❝But then inevitably I find myself wondering whether a proof assistant, or even a formal system, can make the distinction between “technical” and “fundamental” questions. There seems to be no logical distinction. The formalist answer might involve algorithmic complexity, but I don't think that sheds any useful light on the question. The materialist answer (often? usually?) amounts to just‑so stories involving Darwin, and lions on the savannah, and maybe an elephant, or at least a mammoth. I don't find these very satisfying either and would prefer to find something in between, and I would feel vindicated if it could be proved (in I don't know what formal system) that the capacity to make such a distinction entails appreciation of music.❞

Peirce proposed a distinction between “corollarial” and “theorematic” reasoning in mathematics which strikes me as similar to the distinction Michael Harris seeks between “technical” and “fundamental” questions.

I can't say I have a lot of insight into how the distinction might be drawn but I recall a number of traditions pointing to the etymology of “theorem” as having to do with the observation of objects and practices whose depth of detail always escapes full accounting by any number of partial views.

On the subject of music, all I have is the following incidental —

🙞 Riffs and Rotes
oeis.org/wiki/Riffs_and_Rotes

Perhaps it takes a number theorist to appreciate it …

Resource —

Higher Order Sign Relations
oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_S


Inquiry Into Inquiry · Signs Of Signs • 4
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Signs Of Signs • 4

Re: Michael HarrisLanguage About Language

But then inevitably I find myself wondering whether a proof assistant, or even a formal system, can make the distinction between “technical” and “fundamental” questions.  There seems to be no logical distinction.  The formalist answer might involve algorithmic complexity, but I don’t think that sheds any useful light on the question.  The materialist answer (often? usually?) amounts to just‑so stories involving Darwin, and lions on the savannah, and maybe an elephant, or at least a mammoth.  I don’t find these very satisfying either and would prefer to find something in between, and I would feel vindicated if it could be proved (in I don’t know what formal system) that the capacity to make such a distinction entails appreciation of music.

Peirce proposed a distinction between corollarial and theorematic reasoning in mathematics which strikes me as similar to the distinction Michael Harris seeks between technical and fundamental questions.

I can’t say I have a lot of insight into how the distinction might be drawn but I recall a number of traditions pointing to the etymology of theorem as having to do with the observation of objects and practices whose depth of detail always escapes full accounting by any number of partial views.

On the subject of music, all I have is the following incidental —

🙞 Riffs and Rotes

Perhaps it takes a number theorist to appreciate it …

Resources

cc: Academia.edu • BlueSky • Laws of FormMathstodonResearch Gate
cc: Conceptual GraphsCyberneticsStructural ModelingSystems Science

Mathematics without Apologies, by Michael Harris · About the authorMichael Harris is professor of mathematics at the Université Paris-Diderot and Columbia University.  He is the author or coauthor of more than seventy mathematical books and articles, and has recei…
Continued thread

Signs Of Signs • 3
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/03

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language
mathematicswithoutapologies.wo

❝And if we don't [keep our stories straight], who puts us away?❞

One's answer, or at least one's initial response to that question will turn on how one feels about formal realities. As I understand it, reality is that which persists in thumping us on the head until we get what it's trying to tell us. Are there formal realities, forms which drive us in that way?

Discussions like those tend to begin by supposing we can form a distinction between external and internal. That is a formal hypothesis, not yet born out as a formal reality. Are there formal realities which drive us to recognize them, to pick them out of a crowd of formal possibilities?

Resources —

Higher Order Sign Relations
oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_S

Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/03

Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01


Inquiry Into Inquiry · Signs Of Signs • 3
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Signs Of Signs • 3

Re: Michael HarrisLanguage About Language

And if we don’t [keep our stories straight], who puts us away?

One’s answer, or at least one’s initial response to that question will turn on how one feels about formal realities.  As I understand it, reality is that which persists in thumping us on the head until we get what it’s trying to tell us.  Are there formal realities, forms which drive us in that way?

Discussions like those tend to begin by supposing we can form a distinction between external and internal.  That is a formal hypothesis, not yet born out as a formal reality.  Are there formal realities which drive us to recognize them, to pick them out of a crowd of formal possibilities?

Resources

cc: Academia.edu • BlueSky • Laws of FormMathstodonResearch Gate
cc: Conceptual GraphsCyberneticsStructural ModelingSystems Science

Mathematics without Apologies, by Michael HarrisMathematics without Apologies, by Michael HarrisAn unapologetic guided tour of the mathematical life
Continued thread

Signs Of Signs • 2
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/03

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language
mathematicswithoutapologies.wo

❝I compared mathematics to a “consensual hallucination”, like virtual reality, and I continue to believe that the aim is to get (consensually) to the point where that hallucination is a second nature.❞

I think that's called “coherentism”, normally contrasted with or complementary to “objectivism”. It's the philosophy of a gang of co‑conspirators who think, “We'll get off scot‑free so long as we all keep our stories straight.”

Resources —

Higher Order Sign Relations
oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_S

Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/03

Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01


Inquiry Into Inquiry · Signs Of Signs • 2
More from Inquiry Into Inquiry

Signs Of Signs • 2

Re: Michael HarrisLanguage About Language

I compared mathematics to a “consensual hallucination”, like virtual reality, and I continue to believe that the aim is to get (consensually) to the point where that hallucination is a second nature.

I think that’s called coherentism, normally contrasted with or complementary to objectivism.  It’s the philosophy of a gang of co‑conspirators who think, “We’ll get off scot‑free so long as we all keep our stories straight.”

Resources

cc: Academia.edu • BlueSky • Laws of FormMathstodonResearch Gate
cc: Conceptual GraphsCyberneticsStructural ModelingSystems Science

Mathematics without Apologies, by Michael HarrisMathematics without Apologies, by Michael HarrisAn unapologetic guided tour of the mathematical life

Signs Of Signs • 1
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/03

Re: Michael Harris • Language About Language
mathematicswithoutapologies.wo

There is a language and a corresponding literature treating logic and mathematics as related species of communication and information gathering, namely, the pragmatic-semiotic tradition transmitted through the lifelong efforts of C.S. Peirce. It is by no means a dead language but it continues to fly beneath the radar of many trackers in logic and math today. Nevertheless, the resource remains for those who wish to look into it.

Resources —

Higher Order Sign Relations
oeis.org/wiki/Inquiry_Driven_S

Survey of Pragmatic Semiotic Information
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/03

Survey of Semiotics, Semiosis, Sign Relations
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01

academia.edu/community/LpWxoO
researchgate.net/post/Signs_Of


Inquiry Into Inquiry · Signs Of Signs • 1
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Signs Of Signs • 1

Re: Michael HarrisLanguage About Language

There is a language and a corresponding literature treating logic and mathematics as related species of communication and information gathering, namely, the pragmatic‑semiotic tradition transmitted through the lifelong efforts of C.S. Peirce.  It is by no means a dead language but it continues to fly beneath the radar of many trackers in logic and math today.  Nevertheless, the resource remains for those who wish to look into it.

Resources

cc: Academia.edu • BlueSky • Laws of FormMathstodonResearch Gate
cc: Conceptual GraphsCyberneticsStructural ModelingSystems Science

Mathematics without Apologies, by Michael HarrisMathematics without Apologies, by Michael HarrisAn unapologetic guided tour of the mathematical life
Continued thread

Cactus Language • Overview 3.2
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/03

Given a body of conceivable propositions we need a way to follow the threads of their indications from their object domain to their values for the mind and a way to follow those same threads back again. Moreover, we need to implement both ways of proceeding in computational form. Thus we need programs for tracing the clues sentences provide from the universe of their objects to the signs of their values and, in turn, from signs to objects. Ultimately, we need to render propositions so functional as indicators of sets and so essential for examining the equality of sets as to give a rule for the practical conceivability of sets. Tackling that task requires us to introduce a number of new definitions and a collection of additional notational devices, to which we now turn.

Resources —

Cactus Language • Overview
oeis.org/wiki/Cactus_Language_

Survey of Animated Logical Graphs
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/03

Survey of Theme One Program
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/02


Inquiry Into Inquiry · Cactus Language • Overview 3
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Continued thread

Cactus Language • Overview 3.1
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/03

In the development of Cactus Language to date the following two species of graphs have been instrumental.

• Painted And Rooted Cacti (PARCAI).
• Painted And Rooted Conifers (PARCOI).

It suffices to begin with the first class of data structures, developing their properties and uses in full, leaving discussion of the latter class to a part of the project where their distinctive features are key to developments at that stage. Partly because the two species are so closely related and partly for the sake of brevity, we'll always use the genus name “PARC” to denote the corresponding cacti.

To provide a computational middle ground between sentences seen as syntactic strings and propositions seen as indicator functions the language designer must not only supply a medium for the expression of propositions but also link the assertion of sentences to a means for inverting the indicator functions, that is, for computing the “fibers” or “inverse images” of the propositions.


Inquiry Into Inquiry · Cactus Language • Overview 3
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Cactus Language • Overview 2
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/03

In order to facilitate the use of propositions as indicator functions it helps to acquire a flexible notation for referring to propositions in that light, for interpreting sentences in a corresponding role, and for negotiating the requirements of mutual sense between the two domains. If none of the formalisms readily available or in common use meet all the design requirements coming to mind then it is necessary to contemplate the design of a new language especially tailored to the purpose.

In the present application, there is a pressing need to devise a general calculus for composing propositions, computing their values on particular arguments, and inverting their indications to arrive at the sets of things in the universe which are indicated by them.

For computational purposes it is convenient to have a middle ground or an intermediate language for negotiating between the “koine” of sentences regarded as strings of literal characters and the realm of propositions regarded as objects of logical value, even if that makes it necessary to introduce an artificial medium of exchange between the two domains.

If the necessary computations are to be carried out in an organized fashion, and ultimately or partially by familiar classes of machines, then the strings expressing logical propositions are likely to find themselves parsed into tree‑like data structures at some stage of the game. As far as their abstract structures as graphs are concerned, there are several species of graph‑theoretic data structures fitting the task in a reasonably effective and efficient way.


Inquiry Into Inquiry · Cactus Language • Overview 2
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Continued thread

Cactus Language • Overview 1.1
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/03

❝Thus, what looks to us like a sphere of scientific knowledge more accurately should be represented as the inside of a highly irregular and spiky object, like a pincushion or porcupine, with very sharp extensions in certain directions, and virtually no knowledge in immediately adjacent areas. If our intellectual gaze could shift slightly, it would alter each quill’s direction, and suddenly our entire reality would change.❞

— Herbert J. Bernstein • “Idols of Modern Science”

The following report describes a calculus for representing propositions as sentences, that is, as syntactically defined sequences of signs, and for working with those sentences in light of their semantically defined contents as logical propositions. In their computational representation the expressions of the calculus parse into a class of graph‑theoretic data structures whose underlying graphs are called “painted cacti”.

Painted cacti are a specialization of what graph‑theorists refer to as “cacti”, which are in turn a generalization of what they call “trees”. The data structures corresponding to painted cacti have especially nice properties, not only useful in computational terms but interesting from a theoretical standpoint. The remainder of the present Overview is devoted to motivating the development of the indicated family of formal languages, going under the generic name of Cactus Language.


Inquiry Into Inquiry · Cactus Language • Overview 1
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Ouch❢
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2025/02

❝A child hears it said that the stove is hot. But it is not, he says; and, indeed, that central body is not touching it, and only what that touches is hot or cold. But he touches it, and finds the testimony confirmed in a striking way. Thus, he becomes aware of ignorance, and it is necessary to suppose a self in which this ignorance can inhere. …

❝In short, error appears, and it can be explained only by supposing a self which is fallible.

❝Ignorance and error are all that distinguish our private selves from the absolute ego of pure apperception.❞

🙞 C.S. Peirce • “Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed For Man”
cspeirce.com/menu/library/bycs

Resource —

Survey of Cybernetics
inquiryintoinquiry.com/2024/01

Inquiry Into Inquiry · Ouch❢
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#Peirce#Ego#Error