"We don’t know what pressure the Trump administration is using to make intelligence services fall into line, but it isn’t crazy to worry that the NSA might again start monitoring domestic communications.
Because of the Signal chat leak, it’s less likely that they’ll use vulnerabilities in Signal to do that. Equally, bad actors such as drug cartels may also feel safer using Signal. Their security against the US government lies in the fact that the US government shares their vulnerabilities. No one wants their secrets exposed.
I have long advocated for a "defense dominant" cybersecurity strategy. As long as smartphones are in the pocket of every government official, police officer, judge, CEO, and nuclear power plant operator—and now that they are being used for what the White House now calls calls "sensitive," if not outright classified conversations among cabinet members—we need them to be as secure as possible. And that means no government-mandated backdoors.
We may find out more about how officials—including the vice president of the United States—came to be using Signal on what seem to be consumer-grade smartphones, in a apparent breach of the laws on government records. It’s unlikely that they really thought through the consequences of their actions.
Nonetheless, those consequences are real. Other governments, possibly including US allies, will now have much more incentive to break Signal’s security than they did in the past, and more incentive to hack US government smartphones than they did before March 24.
For just the same reason, the US government has urgent incentives to protect them."
https://www.schneier.com/blog/archives/2025/03/the-signal-chat-leak-and-the-nsa.html