SSH over Openssl over Haproxy - - contourner les blocages https://www.journalduhacker.net/s/mnw1al/ssh_over_openssl_over_haproxy_contourner https://blog.victor-hery.com/2024/02/ssh-openssl-haproxy.html #hébergement #openssh
SSH over Openssl over Haproxy - - contourner les blocages https://www.journalduhacker.net/s/mnw1al/ssh_over_openssl_over_haproxy_contourner https://blog.victor-hery.com/2024/02/ssh-openssl-haproxy.html #hébergement #openssh
Neat, OpenSSH client adds variable expansion in "User".
This will allow for much simpler PAM (the privileged access management one) related configuration - for example, expanding user into user%original_hostname etc.
https://github.com/openssh/openssh-portable/commit/bd30cf784d6e825ef71592fb723c41d4f2fd407b
Elegir la identidad SSH que presenta un cliente al servidor
OpenSSH arriba a la versió 10.0. Entre d'altres, inclou l'algoritme mlkem768x25519-sha256, que diuen és a prova d'ordinadors quàntics.
https://www.phoronix.com/news/OpenSSH-10.0-Released
#OpenSSH #Quàntic #mlkem768x25519-sha256
In case anyone is wondering why #ssh (#openssh) is failing silently on #msys2 - seems they pushed out a version that depends on an msys2 runtime version that's stuck in some kind of release queue: https://github.com/msys2/MSYS2-packages/issues/5320
#openssh now defaults to #mlkem768x25519 algorithm for keys. In other words, welcome to quantum resistance being a thing.
Congrats to the team on this release!
La décima versión de OpenSSH viene con el algoritmo mlkem768xto25519-sha256 activado por defecto, que se considera seguro ante ataques con ordenadores cuánticos y además se ha convertido en norma en el NIST #openssh -> https://hardlimit.com/archivo.php?n=2286
I see #OpenSSH got to fully removing DSA key support, so that means my “probably do that in #Paramiko” todo list item has no more excuses
Well, ok, it still has a few excuses (will be years before the average sshd is OpenSSH 10.0+) but still. Needs happenin' sometime and it ain't like old releases go away, so.
Also: #Slackware 15 has a security update for Python3:
http://www.slackware.com/security/viewer.php?l=slackware-security&y=2025&m=slackware-security.326755
Slackware-current just adopted #OpenSSH 10.0.p1 & #OpenSSL 3.5
n/openssh-10.0p1-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. Potentially-incompatible changes include the removal of the weak DSA signature algorithm, completing the deprecation process that began in 2015 (when DSA was disabled by default) and repeatedly warned over the last 12 months.
n/openssl-3.5.0-x86_64-1.txz: Upgraded. New LTS release, supported until 08 Apr 2030.
Portable OpenSSH 10.0p1 will not exist. It will be known as OpenSSH 10.0p2.
https://lists.mindrot.org/pipermail/openssh-unix-announce/2025-April/000163.html
- - -
OpenSSH portable 10.0p1 n’existera pas. Ce sera connue comme OpenSSH 10.0p2.
// Publication en anglais //
#OpenSSH 9.8 und höher kommt allmählich auf die Server. Da wird die Option PerSourcePenalties interessant (siehe https://undeadly.org/cgi?action=article;sid=20240607042157 ) die fail2ban u.ä. überflüssig machen könnte.
Konfig-Beispiele sind aber noch rar gesät. Nach der manpage zu urteilen, sollte aber
PerSourcePenalties authfail:3600s
dafür sorgen dass IPs, die Brute-Force Attacken fahren für 1 Stunde geblockt werden, korrekt?
OpenSSH 10.0 released with hybrid post-quantum algorithm mlkem768x25519-sha256 as default key agreement, new cipher preference list, new options, bug fixes
OpenSSH 10.0: A Leap Forward in Secure Shell Technology
The release of OpenSSH 10.0 introduces significant enhancements in security and functionality, solidifying its status as a cornerstone of secure communications in the tech industry. With new features ...
https://news.lavx.hu/article/openssh-10-0-a-leap-forward-in-secure-shell-technology